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AGDA (M) (4 May 70) FOR OT UT (701239)

18 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade, Period Ending 31 January 1970 (U)

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BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Light)  
APO San Francisco 96279

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade  
For Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65, UIC WFEDAB

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1. (C) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities

a. Command.

(1) Brigadier General W. R. Bond assumed command of the brigade on 28 November 1969 from Major General Warren K. Bennett.

(2) Other changes in command occurred in the 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry; 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry; 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry; 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry; 2nd Battalion, 40th Artillery; 179th Military Intelligence Detachment; Company M (Ranger), 75th Infantry; and the 40th Public Information Detachment. These changes are listed as follows:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>EFF DATE</u>
BG W. R. Bond	CG, 199th Infantry Brigade	28 Nov 69
LTC B. F. Ivey	CO, 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry	15 Dec 69
LTC B. A. Underwood	CO, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry	31 Jan 70
LTC J. R. Black	CO, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry	5 Jan 70
LTC D. A. Beckner	CO, 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry	14 Nov 69
LTC R. H. Bass	CO, 2nd Battalion, 40th Artillery	31 Jan 70
MAJ E. H. Stackman	CO, 179th Military Intelligence Det	1 Nov 69
CPT H. J. Turner	CO, Company M (Ranger), 75th Infantry	18 Nov 69
CPT L. E. Augsburg	CO, 40th Public Information Det	1 Dec 69

(3) Changes of primary and special brigade staff officers were made as follows:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>EFF DATE</u>
COL R. W. Selton	Brigade Deputy Commander	10 Nov 69
LTC R. H. Clark	Brigade Executive Officer	5 Jan 70
LTC T. D. Turner	Brigade Chaplain	6 Nov 69
MAJ R. F. Bell	Brigade S-1	19 Jan 70
MAJ R. C. Skaggs	Brigade S-2	9 Dec 69

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NAME	POSITION	EFT DATE
MAJ E. R. Wiles	Brigade S-5	10 Dec 69
MAJ H. Lewis	Brigade Aviation Officer	5 Jan 70
MAJ P. R. Park	Brigade Inspector General	15 Dec 69
MAJ J. T. Parks	Headquarters Commandant	30 Dec 69
CPT D. A. Bengtson	Staff Judge Advocate	14 Jan 70

## b. Personnel.

(1) The following table indicates assigned brigade strength as of 31 January 1970:

UNIT	OFFICER		WARRANT		ENLISTED		TOTAL	
	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD
HHC, 199th	40	70	8	8	155	353	203	431
2/3 Inf	43	44	2	2	875	771	920	817
3/7 Inf	43	45	2	3	875	780	920	828
4/12 Inf	43	42	2	2	875	773	920	817
5/12 Inf	43	42	2	2	875	767	920	811
2/40 Arty	52	52	3	3	587	549	642	604
7 Spt Bn	42	47	9	11	490	574	541	632
D/17 Cav	5	5	0	0	205	207	210	212
Co M, 75 Inf	2	2	0	0	59	55	61	57
87 Engr Co	5	5	0	0	160	165	165	170
313 Sig Co	3	5	0	0	99	118	102	123
40 PI Det	2	3	0	0	3	8	5	11
44 MH Det	1	1	0	0	1	2	2	3
49 SD Plt	1	1	0	0	27	31	28	32
76 Inf Det	0	0	0	0	10	11	10	11
152 MP Plt	1	1	0	0	39	49	40	50
179 MI Det	9	5	2	3	21	53	32	61
503 Chem Det	1	1	0	0	4	7	5	8
RCTC	0	9	0	2	0	226	0	237
TOTALS	336	380	30	36	5360	5499	5726	5915

(2) Special Services activities were as follows:

(a) Movies were picked up from the Army/Air Force Motion Picture Service in Saigon and were distributed to the units of the brigade and to the 12th Aviation Group; Company D (Ranger), 75th Infantry; Strategic Communications Receiver Station (STRATCOM); and the 66th Engineer Company.

(b) The Special Services Recreational Area was utilized as follows:

1 The Special Services swimming pool and miniature golf course had an average attendance of 200 per day for the period 1 November 69 through 31 January 70. During the period the north deck of the pool was redecked and the water pump was repaired.

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2 The Special Services Library had a three month attendance of 6,740.

3 The Special Services Photo Lab had a three month attendance of 2,666. One new enlarger was received.

(c) The Redcatcher Express, a six man Special Services combo, was formed in November and put on 23 performances during the ensuing three month period. Money was allocated by the Open Mess System on 19 December to purchase some of the equipment for the combo.

(d) On 12 December 1969, the Special Services Office in conjunction with the Brigade S-5 Office presented an hour of popular and folk music sung by thirty Vietnamese Nationals at the 2/3d Infantry's parade field at the Brigade Main Base (BMB).

(e) The following USO shows were taken to forward fire support bases (FSB's):

1 On 15 December 1969, the USO handshake tour featuring professional baseball players Tug McGraw and Ron Taylor of the New York Mets, Pete Ward of the Chicago White Sox and broadcaster Bob Elson visited Xuan Loc and FSB's NANCY, LIBBY and MACE.

2 On 31 January 1970, the USO handshake tour featuring professional football players Jim Nance, Dan Conners, Gary Garrison, Len Rhode, Norman Snead, and Chris Hanburger visited FSB's BLACKHORSE, LIBBY, NANCY and MACE.

(f) On 28 December 1969, the Special Services Office coordinated transportation for 17 busloads of 199th personnel who attended the Bob Hope Christmas Show at Curry Amphitheater on Long Binh Post. A total of 900 REDCATCHERS saw the show.

(g) Brigade basketball competition featuring two leagues began on 1 January 1970. League play ended on 31 January with Company B, 7th Support Battalion and the 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry tied for first place in the "A" League and HHC, 199th Infantry and 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry tied for first place in the "B" League. The championship games will be played in February.

(h) A Swiss style chess tournament began on 28 January 1970 with 20 participants competing.

(3) Out-of-Country R&R Participation:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ALLOCATIONS</u>	<u>UTILIZED</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
HHC, 199th	161	156	97
2/3 Inf	242	256	106
3/7 Inf	246	230	93
4/12 Inf	243	244	100
5/12 Inf	240	248	103

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ALLOCATIONS</u>	<u>UTILIZED</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
2/40 Arty	175	183	105
7 Spt Bn	219	232	106
D/17 Cav	71	59	84
87 Engr Co.	60	37	62
313 Sig Co.	29	17	59
179 MI Det	18	22	122
856 Radio Research Det	17	9	53
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>1,721</b>	<b>1,699</b>	<b>98</b>

(4) In-Country R&R Participation:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ALLOCATIONS</u>	<u>UTILIZED</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
HHC, 199th	19	13	68
2/3 Inf	32	42	131
3/7 Inf	36	25	70
4/12 Inf	29	30	103
5/12 Inf	32	23	72
2/40 Arty	21	16	76
7 Spt Bn	29	42	144
D/17 Cav	10	14	140
87 Engr Co.	8	8	100
313 Sig Co.	5	4	80
179 MI Det	3	1	33
856 Radio Research Det	3	6	200
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>227</b>	<b>224</b>	<b>99</b>

(5) For the months of November through January, the AG Awards and Decorations section completed the following awards:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>MOH</u>	<u>DSC</u>	<u>DSM</u>	<u>SS</u>	<u>LM</u>	<u>DFC</u>	<u>SM</u>	<u>BSMV</u>	<u>BSM</u>	<u>AMV</u>	<u>AM</u>	<u>ACMV</u>	<u>ACM</u>	<u>PH</u>
HHC, 199	0	0	1	1	2	10	0	0	147	3	40	2	46	7
2/3 Inf	0	1	0	8	0	1	1	48	76	0	4	28	786	12
3/7 Inf	0	1	0	12	0	0	0	61	83	0	127	27	1078	28
4/12 Inf	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	45	75	2	67	40	1213	14
5/12 Inf	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	44	58	0	61	33	920	19
2/40 Arty	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	69	0	7	0	672	7
7 Spt Bn	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	72	0	2	0	637	0
D/17 Cav	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	9	0	0	8	176	1
75th Rang	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	8	0	1	2	56	0
87 Engr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	11	0	4	0	154	2
313 Sig	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	57	0
40 PID	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	10	0
44 MHD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	5	0
49 SD Plt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	49	0
76 CTT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	28	0

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UNIT	MOH	DSC	DSM	SS	LM	DFC	SM	BSMV	BSM	AMV	AM	ACMV	ACM	PH
152 MP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	43	1
179 MID	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	1	0	63	0
503 Chem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	0	4	0
856 RFD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	14	0
TOTALS	0	2	1	23	2	11	3	209	632	5	314	136	6422	91

(6) Future Outlook for Awards: The Meritorious Unit Citations for 87th Engineers; 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry and Headquarters and Headquarters Company are still being processed at Headquarters USARV. The Meritorious Unit Citation for 7th Support and the Gallantry Cross W/Palm for the 199th Infantry Brigade have been approved by USARV Awards and the 199th Infantry Brigade is now awaiting orders from DA on both awards. 2nd Battalion, 40th Artillery has been submitted for a Meritorious Unit Citation and it is now being processed at Headquarters USARV.

(7) Losses During the period 1 November 1969 to 31 January 1970:

(a) Battle losses:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1 Killed in action:	2	0	34	36
2 Died of wounds:	0	0	3	3
3 Wounded in action:	11	0	253	264
4 Missing in action:	0	0	0	0
5 Captured:	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
6 TOTALS:	13	0	290	303

(b) Non-battle losses:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1 Non-battle dead:	0	0	21	21
2 Non-battle injured/disease:	11	0	521	532
3 Non-battle missing:	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
4 TOTALS:	11	0	542	553

(8) Units of the Brigade.

(a) Units of the brigade are shown at Inclosure 1, Organisational Chart.

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(b) Units operating under the control of the 199th Infantry Brigade and the dates of brigade control during the quarter were:

- 1 Troop D, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment—4 Jan to 31 Jan 70.
- 2 Troop D, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry—1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.
- 3 3d Platoon, 120th Transportation Company, 7th Battalion, 48th Transportation Group—1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.

c. Intelligence.

(1) General. The enemy maintained his policy of small-scale attacks against hamlets and Popular Force (PF)/Regional Force (RF)/ Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) outposts, with emphasis on targeting allied efforts at pacification and Vietnamization. The fall-winter offensive began with attacks by fire on 4 to 11 November 1969, and reached its first high point in early December 1969. As a result of B-52 strikes north and south of Trang Bom Village, and in the La Nga River area in mid-December, the enemy postponed the Christmas "highpoint" until the TET 1970 phase of the winter-spring offensive. The winter-spring offensive opened with attacks by fire on the morning of 21 January 1970 against FSB BAU CA and Camp Frenzell-Jones, the BMB.

(2) Main Force Units:

(a) Enemy main force units located in the brigade's Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) during the reporting period were:

- 1 Headquarters, Military Region 7.
- 2 The 274th Viet Cong (VC) Regiment.
- 3 The 33d North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Regiment.
- 4 The J600 Transportation Battalion/Sub-Region (SR) 4.
- 5 The 74th Artillery Regiment.
- 6 Headquarters, U-1 Province (D-1 and D-2 Sapper Battalions).
- 7 The D-6 Sapper Battalion.
- 8 The 81st Rear Service Group.
- 9 The 84th Rear Service Group.
- 10 The Rear Service Elements of SR-5.
- 11 Headquarters, Ba Long Province.

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## 12 The D525 Engineer Battalion.

(b) During the period, the enemy in the brigade's TAOR continued to attempt to carry out the basic plan of COSVN Resolution #9, which was explained in a captured document as:

- 1 Destroy the Free World Military Assistance Forces (FVMAF)/Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) war potentials.

- 2 Disrupt the Government of Vietnam's (GVN) pacification program.

- 3 Maintain heavy military pressure on urban areas (which would relieve Allied pressure on the rural areas).

- 4 Enlarge VC controlled areas to put the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) in an unfavorable situation when a cease fire is stipulated.

- 5 Expand military and political organizations.

- 6 Attack convoys to weaken logistical support.

(c) During November 1969, the 33d NVA Regiment continued to conduct operations SW of the La Nga River, in support of the local force elements. Typically, two battalions and the regimental headquarters remained in the La Nga area, while the remaining battalion regrouped and picked up supplies in northern Dinh Quan District and War Zone D. Attacks by the 33d NVA Regiment in support of local force elements were highlighted by the 22 November 1969 attack on Binh Loc Hamlet (vicinity YT 453135). While pushing them out of Binh Loc, Company D, 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry inflicted losses of 12 enemy killed in action (KIA) body count (BC) on the 1st Battalion, 33d NVA Regiment.

(d) During November, the 2nd Battalion, 274th VC Regiment continued to operate in War Zone D from the Song Dong Nai to the Rang Rang area. The remainder of the regiment remained in their traditional base areas avoiding allied activities.

(e) Documents captured in November 1969 verified that the 525th Engineer Battalion is subordinate to MR-7. The same documents also revealed that the D6 Sapper Battalion is no longer OPCON to U-1 Province, but is rather directly subordinate to MR-7.

(f) The enemy planned to intensify his activity during the Christmas truce but it appears that B-52 strikes in the La Nga River Basin (targeted against the 33d NVA Regiment) and in northern Bien Hoa Province (along major infiltration routes) sufficiently disrupted the enemy to cause a postponement of main force activity in the brigade's TAOR. In mid-January 1970, the 33d NVA Regiment left the La Nga River Basin (possibly leaving one battalion behind), and moved into the area south of Vo Dat. In addition to avoiding activities of the 199th Infantry Brigade, it is possible that the 33d NVA Regiment intends to pose a threat to the Vo Dat area, its pacification

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program, and its large supply of rice which is greatly needed by hungry VC/NVA forces. On the night of 31 January 1970, at YT 801297, the ambush position (AP) and command post (CP) of Company C, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry was hit by 60mm and 82mm mortars, rocket propelled grenades (RPG) and small arms in a well coordinated attack by the enemy (probably the 33d NVA Regiment). Results of this action were 2 US KIA and 26 US WIA with 5 enemy KIA. Thus, the enemy maintains his capability to launch well coordinated attacks when an opportunity presents itself.

(g) In December 1969, the 2nd Battalion, 274th VC Regiment moved its major elements south of the Song Dong Nai, into the vicinity of the Bau Ham Supply Depot (vicinity YT 2515). The battalion continued its supply activities with elements still being contacted in the Rang Rang area (vicinity YT 2154). The 1st and 3d Battalions and the Headquarters of the 274th VC Regiment moved west and south into the Hat Dich, and the area south of the Binh Son Rubber Plantation, avoiding major contacts and launching no significant attacks.

(h) After being subordinated directly to MR-7, the D6 Sapper Battalion moved south out of U-1 Province to the Hat Dich. In mid-January 1970, the D6 Sapper Battalion then moved back north to the vicinity of Tan Lap Village, with the C66 Company being contacted north of Highway #1, on Hill 396 (vicinity YT 389125).

(i) Throughout the period, the Headquarters of Military Region 7 remained within the Nui Hok (vicinity YT 713087)/Nui Phu (vicinity YT 752103) area, directing the activities of its subordinate areas and units. Documents taken from bodies on 21 November 1969 at YS 438868, reveal that the ambush resulted in the deaths of the Deputy Chief of Staff, and Deputy Chief of the Political Staff/MR-7, as well as the CO, C195th Sapper/Reconnaissance Company/MR-7.

(j) The 3d Battalion, 74th Artillery Regiment continued to conduct sporadic attacks by fire upon the Bien Hoa-Long Binh areas during the reporting period. The 2nd Battalion, 74th Artillery Regiment remained in the Rung Sat until late January when they moved north to the Suoi Sau/Song Nhan area (vicinity YT 2800). The 1st Battalion, 74th Artillery Regiment was not identified within the brigade's AO during the reporting period.

(k) The units of U-1 Province avoided major contacts during the reporting period while maintaining their traditional base areas. The Headquarters and Rear Service elements of U-1 Province continued to suffer steady losses and difficulties due to blocking and sweep operations conducted by the 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry in the Bau Ham to Trang Bom area.

(l) Operations by the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry and the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) against the "Sparrow" (Center of Mass (COM), YT 5199) and the Nui May Tao area (COM YT 7491) in late December 1969 and January 1970 inflicted heavy losses in base areas and supplies on both the Ba Long Pro-

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vince Headquarters and the 84th Rear Service Group. Because these operations were not conducted simultaneously, they did not result in a significant loss of enemy personnel. The enemy was able to avoid significant losses of personnel by moving across AO boundaries.

## (3) Local Force Activities:

(a) The local force units of MR-7 continued their primary mission of harassment of RF/PF/Popular Self Defense Forces (PSDF) personnel and village and hamlet officials, as well as the traditional mission of providing food-stuffs and guides for the main force elements operating within their area of responsibility. Most of the food is obtained directly as taxes or is purchased from VC suppliers along the highways and in certain villages known to provide VC agents with the required commodities.

(b) An increase in propaganda activities by local force units was noted during the anti-war demonstrations in the U.S. The normal themes in favor of letting the Vietnamese settle their own affairs and requesting movement back to former villages, as well as those against the increase in government taxation, were emphasized. The above propaganda themes implemented the instructions of COSVN Resolution #9. Resolution #9 also ordered an increase in guerrilla warfare. Terrorist activity increased in certain areas of the TAOR, as did the harassment of small Vietnamese outposts. In almost all instances, the contact was broken within five minutes, indicating an effort to further comply with COSVN's instructions to conserve manpower and ammunition while inflicting maximum casualties on friendly forces.

(c) A captured document from MR-7 to the D65th Sapper-Engineer Battalion ordered that battalion to implement a training program for local force units and guerrillas in engineering and demolition. Small unit tactics employed by friendly forces have greatly hampered enemy supply, communication, and movement operations. Documents, ralliers and other sources reveal that the enemy units are constantly short of food and are finding it increasingly difficult to force the populace to take risks in providing supplies for the VC.

(d) Local force and supply elements have rallied because of artillery fire, airstrikes, starvation, disbelief in the communist cause, hope in an imminent cease-fire, the general feeling that "the enemy is everywhere", a lack of medical supplies and facilities and resentment of the overbearing attitude of the NVA.

## (4) Statistical Summary:

(a) Contents of enemy caches discovered during the period:

AK-47 rifles	0
AK-47 ammunition (rounds)	5,500
AK-47 magazines	60

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B-40 rocket rounds	6
B-41 rocket rounds	7
60mm mortar rounds	224
81mm mortar rounds	214
82mm mortar rounds	2,163
Chicom grenades	210
Medicine (pounds)	60
Rice (pounds)	6,000
Foodstuffs (pounds)	21,760

(b) Cumulative enemy losses inflicted by the 199th Infantry Brigade during the period:

VC/NVA KIA (BC)	479
VC/NVA KIA (Probable)	0
PW	13
Hoi Chanhs	5
VC Infrastructure (VCI) eliminated/neutralized	10
Small arms captured/destroyed	242
Crew served weapons captured/destroyed	5
Small arms ammo captured/destroyed (rounds)	16,901
Crew served ammo captured/destroyed (rounds)	22
Fortifications destroyed	2,908
Grenades captured/destroyed	198
Sampans captured/destroyed	3
Rice captured/destroyed (pounds)	2,440

## d. Operations, Plans and Training.

(1) During the reporting period, the 199th Light Infantry Brigade (LIB) continued Campaign Toan Thang, commencing Phase IV on 1 November 1969. The brigade Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) remained Long Khanh Province, northwestern Binh Tuy Province and the portions of eastern Bien Hoa Province between Highway #1 and the Dong Nai River. Brigade operations continue to be planned and executed in order to accomplish the three facets of the brigade mission: 1) Support of pacification. 2) Upgrading the effectiveness of the 18th ARVN Division and territorial forces. 3) Elimination of the enemy.

(a) Hamlet Upgrading Teams (HUT) at battalion level have continued to conduct training and operations with RF/PF units at selected hamlets to further the pacification effort and improve the operational capability of these units. The teams concentrate on the essentials of rifle marksmanship, weapons maintenance and ambush techniques. The program is geared to the needs of the individual hamlet and normally is two days in duration. Of the 33 RF Companies and 95 PF Platoons in the brigade TAOI, 12 companies and 74 platoons have received such training.

(b) The improvement of ARVN and territorial force units in the conduct of operations has continued through combined, coordinated and complementary operations down to and including squad level. Continued emphasis will be placed on improving the combat capability of RVNAF elements so that they

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may take over the responsibility for the security of their area.

(c) The targeting of local forces in and near the populated areas and the surveillance and engagement of main force elements to isolate them from local force units has met with a measure of success. Operations have continued in southwest Long Khanh, southeast Bien Hoa and northwest Phouc Tuy Province (Operation FRIENDSHIP III) targeted against the 274th VC Regiment in that area. Close coordination between the 199th and the other participating forces, i.e., the 18th ARVN Division, The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF) and the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) has contributed to the tactical success of this operation.

(2) Land clearing operations have been conducted in the Gang Toi area (eastern Bien Hoa and western Long Khanh Provinces bounded on the north by the Dong Nai River and on the south by Highway #1) during the last months. A total of 4,150 acres have been cut in strips to facilitate interdiction of communication/liaison routes and rapid employment of reaction forces through otherwise difficult terrain.

## (3) Summary of Operations Conducted:

(a) 1-7 November 1969: The 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry conducted combined and coordinated operations with the 48th ARVN Regiment and territorial forces in southwestern Long Khanh Province and in the FRIENDSHIP III operational area. On 1 November, Company A, 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry established FSB CRISTOL (vicinity YS 3097) to provide a base of operations deep in this traditional enemy base area. Company B, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry continued OPCON to the 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry until 3 November, when it returned to EMB for a three-day stand-down. On 6 November, Company D, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry became OPCON to the 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry for operations in the FRIENDSHIP III operational area. On 7 November, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry engaged an estimated squad southwest of FSB BLACKHORSE, resulting in two enemy KIA. The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry conducted combined and coordinated operations in southern and eastern Long Khanh Province with the 52nd ARVN Regiment and territorial forces. Company A, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry ended its stand-down at EMB on 3 November. On 2 and 3 November, Recon, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, conducting ground reconnaissance operations southeast of Gia Ray, accounted for five enemy KIA and two AK-47's captured in three separate engagements. On 7 November, an AP from Company A, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, located east of FSB BLACKHORSE, engaged six enemy resulting in three enemy KIA. The 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry conducted combined operations in northeastern Long Khanh Province with the 43d ARVN Regiment and territorial forces in northwestern Binh Tuy Province. The 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry conducted combined and coordinated operations with the 43d ARVN Regiment and territorial forces in west-central Long Khanh Province. On 7 November, Company A, 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry, conducting ground reconnaissance operations south of the Cay Gao rubber plantation, engaged five enemy, resulting in two enemy KIA. Troop D, 17th Armored Cavalry (-) became OPCON to the 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry effective 2 November 1969 for security operations in support of Gang Toi

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land clearing (COM, YT 2723). One platoon of Troop D, 17th Armored Cavalry was OPCON to the 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry. Company M (Ranger), 75th Infantry conducted surveillance operations of crossing sites along the Dong Nai River north of the Cay Gao rubber plantation until 4 November. On 1 November, Team A, Company M (Ranger), 75th Infantry engaged an estimated company, resulting in one US WHA and two enemy KIA. Company D, 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry supported the contact. Ranger teams were inserted on 7 November north of the Dong Nai River along the Rang Rang road. Troop C, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry (DS) conducted hunter-killer team (HKT) operations in support of the brigade and the 18th ARVN Division units through the TAOI.

(b) 8-14 November 1969: The 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry continued operations in southwestern Long Khanh Province and in the FRIENDSHIP III Operational area. On 9 November, Company B, 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry was involved in a series of contacts in the vicinity of Ap Tan Lap with light fire teams (LFT) and artillery in support. The results of these engagements were three enemy KIA. During the week, Companies B and C, 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry discovered graves containing 19 enemy KIA in the vicinity of YS 2797. The enemy were killed as a result of recent contacts in this area. The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry continued operations in southern and eastern Long Khanh Province. On 8 November, a platoon ambush from Company C, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry with elements of the 176th RF Company engaged an estimated 30-40 enemy southwest of Ap Suoi Cat (vicinity YT 5906). 18 enemy were killed and 6 K-54 pistols, 5 AK-47's and 2 Chinese Communist rifles were captured as a result of this action. Three additional bodies were subsequently located. On 10 November, Recon, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry was engaged by an estimated enemy company west of Signal Mountain. Fifteen US were wounded and one observation helicopter was shot down in the action while four enemy were killed by US elements. The 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry continued operations in northeastern Long Khanh Province. Company D, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry was OPCON to the 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry during the week. On 10 November, Company B, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry engaged three enemy northeast of Dinh Quan resulting in two enemy KIA. On 11 November, Company A, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry completed destruction of FSB WARRIOR in the rice bowl area in northwestern Binh Tuy Province and returned to Long Khanh Province. The 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry continued operations in west-central Long Khanh Province. Elements of the 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry provided security for land/clearing operations and established a FSB (vicinity YT 2527) to support the Gan Toi land cut. Troop D, 17th Cavalry, minus one platoon OPCON to the 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry, continued security operations in the Gang Toi land clearing operational area OPCON to the 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry. Company M (Ranger), 75th Infantry continued ranger operations in the area north of the Dong Nai River in the vicinity of the Rang Rang road. On 11 November, two ranger teams engaged the point element of an estimated enemy platoon. This action resulted in six of the enemy KIA, with one US killed and one US wounded. Ranger teams were extracted from the operational area on 13 November. Troop C, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry (DS) continued operations in support of the brigade and RVNAF elements in the TAOI.

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(c) 15-21 November 1969: The 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry continued operations in southwestern Long Khanh Province and in the FRIENDSHIP III operational area. Company A, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry became OPCON to the 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry effective 16 November 1969, replacing Company D, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry. Company A, 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry conducted a three-day stand-down beginning 19 November. On 20 November, elements of Company C, 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry experienced symptoms of exposure to chemical agents in a tunnel near YT 313013. Subsequent investigation by the Brigade Chemical Officer indicated that no chemical agent was present. Analysis of air and soil samples had negative results. The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry continued operations in southern and eastern Long Khanh Province. On 18 and 19 November, platoons of Company D, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry engaged two small groups of enemy southeast of Gia Ray, resulting in three enemy KIA and three weapons captured. The 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry continued operations in north-eastern Long Khanh Province. On 20 November, a platoon of Company C, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry discovered a cache south of Dinh Quan consisting of one SKS, three M-1 carbines, nine anti-tank rounds, two B-40 rounds, three Chinese Communist grenades and a US claymore mine. The 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry continued operations in west-central Long Khanh Province. On 21 November, Company A, 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry, while conducting an ambush north of Bau Ham Hamlet, engaged an estimated platoon-size force, resulting in one enemy KIA and one PW and pistol captured. Troop D, 17th Armored Cavalry (-) continued security operations in support of the Gang Toi land clearing. Company M (Ranger), 75th Infantry inserted into an area southwest of the Cay Gao rubber plantation on 18 November. Contacts in the area resulted in three enemy KIA prior to extraction on 20 November. Troop C, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry (DS), in support of the brigade and RVNAF elements, accounted for nine enemy KIA during the week.

(d) 22-28 November 1969: The 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry, continued operations in southwestern Long Khanh Province and in the FRIENDSHIP III operational area. Company A, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry was relieved from OPCON to the 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry on 22 November and was placed OPCON to the 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry. This change in OPCON was brought about by a shift of the boundary between the two battalions from north of Highway #1 to south of the railroad. On 27 November, Company A, 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry conducted a bomb damage assessment (EDA) in the southern part of the FRIENDSHIP III operational area. A contact during the EDA resulted in a total of four enemy KIA. The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry continued operations in southern and eastern Long Khanh Province. During the period 24-28 November, a task force under the control of the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry conducted a combined cordon and search of Bau Ham (vicinity of YT 2912). The task force consisted of Companies C and D, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry; Company B, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry; and Company A, 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry. Twenty-nine suspects were detained as a result of this operation. The 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry continued operations in northeastern Long Khanh Province. On 25 November, Recon, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry engaged an estimated 15 enemy in

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bunkers southwest of Dinh Quan, resulting in two enemy KIA and one AK-47 captured. The 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry continued operations in west-central Long Khanh Province. On 22 November, Company D, 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry, while in a night defensive position (NDP) near Binh Loc Village, engaged an unknown size enemy force. Sporadic contact continued through the night with support from artillery, Army aviation and tactical air. The action resulted in 12 enemy KIA and assorted arms, ammunition and equipment captured. On 28 November, a platoon of Company C, 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry engaged an estimated 5 to 6 enemy in the vicinity of Binh Loc Village, resulting in two enemy KIA and two individual weapons captured. Troop D, 17th Armored Cavalry (-) continued security operations in the Gang Toi land clearing area OPCON to the 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry. Company M (Ranger), 75th Infantry conducted ranger operations along the Dong Nai River, northwest of FSB LIBBY, during the period 24-27 November. Troop C, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry (DS) continued to support brigade and RVNAF elements with visual reconnaissance (VR), HKT and Fire-fly aircraft.

(e) 29 November-5 December 1969: The 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry continued operations in southwestern Long Khanh Province and in the FRIENDSHIP III operational area. On 29 November, Recon, 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry engaged an estimated four enemy north of FSB CRISTOL, resulting in two enemy KIA and two AK-47's captured. In two separate contacts east of FSB CRISTOL, Company A, 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry accounted for three enemy KIA and two individual weapons captured. On 3 December, Company D, 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry conducted ground reconnaissance operations northwest of FSB CRISTOL. Contacts during this operation resulted in three enemy KIA and two AK-47's captured. On 5 December, a platoon of Company A, 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry was engaged by an estimated enemy platoon in a cleared area south of FSB CRISTOL resulting in two US KIA, five US WHA, and three enemy KIA. The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry continued operations in southern and eastern Long Khanh Province. On 29 November, Company C, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry was engaged by snipers southwest of Signal Mountain, resulting in two US WHA, three enemy KIA and three individual weapons captured. The 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry continued operations in northeastern Long Khanh Province. Company D, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry continued OPCON to the 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry until 3 December. The 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry continued operations in west-central Long Khanh Province. On 4 December, Company D, 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry engaged an estimated 5 to 10 enemy north of Bau Ham, resulting in five enemy KIA. Troop D, 17th Armored Cavalry (-) continued OPCON to the 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry, conducting security operations in support of the Gang Toi land clearing. Company M (Ranger), 75th Infantry inserted into an operational area north of the La Nga River on 1 December. Operations in the area resulted in one enemy KIA and the discovery of a cache consisting of 50 82mm mortar rounds and 500 rounds of .51 caliber ammunition. Operations by Troop C, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry (DS) in support of the brigade and RVNAF forces resulted in four enemy KIA and 10 hootches, a bunker and a sampan destroyed.

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(f) 6-12 December 1969: The 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry continued operations in southwestern Long Khanh Province and in the FRIENDSHIP III operational area. On 8 December, Recon, 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry engaged an estimated platoon north of FSB CRISTOL, resulting in three enemy KIA and two individual weapons captured. The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry continued operations in southern and eastern Long Khanh Province. Company D, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry commenced a three-day stand-down on 7 December. On 10 December, Company B, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry engaged three enemy south of Gia Ray. Results of this contact were one enemy KIA, two PW and two individual weapons captured. Also on 10 December, Company D, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry conducted an air-mobile assault south of the Company B contact, engaging an estimated two platoons resulting in five enemy KIA. The 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry continued operations in northeastern Long Khanh Province. On 9 December 1969, Company C, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry engaged two enemy south of FSB NANCY resulting in two enemy KIA and two AK-47's captured. On 10 December, Company C, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry began a three-day stand-down. On 11 and 12 December, Company A, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry located and destroyed caches containing forty-seven 82mm mortar rounds, 123 recoilless rifle rounds (57mm), fifty 12.7mm anti-aircraft rounds and five RPG rounds along the Dong Nai River north of Dinh Quan. The 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry continued operations in west-central Long Khanh Province. On 6 December, Company D, 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry engaged an enemy force which withdrew into a basecamp northwest of Bau Ham Hamlet. Air strikes, artillery and helicopter gunships supported the contact, resulting in a total of 19 enemy KIA. On 9 December, Recon, 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry discovered and destroyed or captured 34 cases of 82mm mortar rounds, forty B-40 rocket rounds and 12 RPG-7 rocket launchers north of the Dong Nai River along the Rang Rang road. Troop D, 17th Armored Cavalry (-) continued OPCON to the 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry, conducting security operations in support of the Gang Toi land clearing. Company M (Ranger), 75th Infantry conducted operations in support of the 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry north of the Dong Nai River and in the La Nga River base area. Troop C, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry (DS) continued to support brigade and RVNAF elements with VR, HKT and Firefly aircraft.

(g) 13-19 December 1969: The 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry continued operations in southwestern Long Khanh Province and in the FRIENDSHIP III operational area. Company B, 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry conducted a three-day stand-down beginning 16 December. A platoon of Troop D, 17th Armored Cavalry continued OPCON to the 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry until 17 December 1969. The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry continued operations in southern and eastern Long Khanh Province. On 13 December, Company D, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry engaged an estimated squad southeast of Signal Mountain (Hill 837), resulting in three enemy KIA and three AK-47's captured. On 17 December, Company B, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry accounted for three enemy KIA in two contacts southwest of Signal Mountain. Again on 19 December, an engagement involving Company B, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, in the same general area, resulted in three enemy KIA. The 4th

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Battalion, 12th Infantry continued operations in northeastern Long Khanh Province. Recon, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry, on 14 December, engaged two small groups of personnel south of the La Nga River, resulting in two enemy KIA. The 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry continued operations in west-central Long Khanh Province. A sniper team, operating north of Bau Ham Hamlet, accounted for four enemy KIA on 13 December and another two enemy KIA on 17 December. Gang Toi land clearing operations terminated on 13 December. Troop D, 17th Armored Cavalry (-) conducted a stand-down at BMB from 13 to 17 December, before commencing troop operations east of Gia Ray OPCON to the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry. Company M (Ranger), 75th Infantry conducted ranger operations north and east of FSB LIBBY and in the Operation FRIENDSHIP III operational area. Troop C, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry (DS) continued operations in support of the brigade and 18th ARVN Division and territorial force units.

(h) 20-26 December 1969: The 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry continued operations in southwestern Long Khanh Province and in the FRIENDSHIP III operational area. Minor contacts in the area resulted in four enemy KIA and 40 bunkers destroyed during the week. The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry continued operations in southern and eastern Long Khanh Province. On 21 December, Recon, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, operating with a platoon of Troop D, 17th Armored Cavalry engaged an estimated squad east of Gia Ray, resulting in three enemy KIA. On 26 December, Company B, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry engaged an estimated 15 enemy southwest of Gia Ray, resulting in three enemy KIA. Troop D, 17th Armored Cavalry continued OPCON to the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry. The 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry continued operations in northeastern Long Khanh Province. On 21 December, the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry's Tiger Patrol (the battalion's name for gun-jeps operating independently) engaged an estimated 10 to 15 enemy on Highway #20 northeast of Dinh Quan, resulting in 10 enemy KIA and five individual weapons captured. The 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry continued operations in west-central Long Khanh Province. On 22 December, Company B, 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry engaged an enemy force northwest of Bau Ham Hamlet resulting in two enemy KIA. Company B, 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry also located five enemy KIA as a result of an Arclight strike on 24 December in the same general area. Company M (Ranger), 75th Infantry terminated operations east of FSB LIBBY on 20 December and continued operations in the FRIENDSHIP III operational area. Troop C, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry (DS) continued to support brigade and RVNAF elements with VR, HKT and Firefly aircraft.

(i) 27 December 1969-2 January 1970: The 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry continued operations in southwestern Long Khanh Province and in the FRIENDSHIP III operational area. On 28 December, Company B, 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry engaged an estimated platoon west of FSB CRISTOL, vicinity YS 2599. This contact resulted in two US WHA and three enemy KIA. On 31 December, FSB CRISTOL received nine rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in one US KIA and nine US WHA. The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry continued operations in southern and eastern Long Khanh Province. Troop D, 17th

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Armored Cavalry continued OPCON to the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, conducting troop operations east and southeast of Gia Ray. The 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry continued operations in northeastern Long Khanh Province. On 28 December, in two engagements with small forces north of Dinh Quan, elements of Company A, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry accounted for two enemy KIA and captured an AK-47. On 2 January, Recon, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry was engaged by an estimated three enemy; return fire resulted in 4 enemy KIA. This contact occurred in the La Nga River base area. The 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry continued operations in west-central Long Khanh Province. Company M (Ranger), 75th Infantry continued operations in the FRIENDSHIP III operational area until 30 December. Operations commenced in the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry's area of operations (AO), east of FSB BLACKHORSE, on 31 December. Troop C, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry (DS) continued operations in support of brigade, 18th ARVN Division and territorial forces.

(j) 3-9 January 1970: The 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry continued its operations in southwestern Long Khanh Province and in the FRIENDSHIP III operational area. The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry continued operations in southern and eastern Long Khanh Province. On 3 January, Company B, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, conducting combined operations with elements of the 285th RF Company — southwest of Gia Ray — engaged an estimated enemy platoon resulting in five enemy KIA and two individual weapons captured. On 5 January, the same elements accounted for seven enemy KIA as well as the capture of five individual weapons and a large number of documents. The 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry continued operations in northeastern Long Khanh Province. Contacts in the area were light, but a small arms cache was located southeast of Dinh Quan. Recon, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry became OPCON to brigade headquarters for special operations effective 9 January 1970. The 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry continued operations in west-central Long Khanh Province accounting for five enemy KIA in actions south of FSB LIBBY and north of the Cay Gao rubber plantation. Troop D, 17th Armored Cavalry continued OPCON to the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry. Troop D, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment became OPCON to the brigade effective 4 January. Troop D, 1st Squadron, 11th ACR conducted operations east of Gia Ray, OPCON to the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, until 9 January. Company M (Ranger), 75th Infantry continued operations, east of FSB BLACKHORSE until 7 January, accounting for two enemy KIA. On 9 January, ranger teams commenced operations in the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry's AO. Troop C, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry (DS) continued operations in support of brigade, 18th ARVN Division and territorial forces, resulting in four enemy KIA north of the Cay Gao rubber plantation and three enemy KIA south of Gia Ray.

(k) 10-16 January 1970: The 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry continued to operate in southwestern Long Khanh Province and in the FRIENDSHIP III operational area. Troop D, 1st Squadron, 11th ACR became OPCON to the 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry effective 11 January 1970. On 13 January, Company D, 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry detained 8 enemy suppliers and 2 PW, capturing medical supplies, drugs, canned foods and 22,000 piasters in operations south

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of PSB BLACKHORSE. In the same general area on 15 January, Company D, 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry engaged an enemy force resulting in two enemy KIA and four individual weapons captured or located. The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry continued operations in its AO. On 10 January, Recon, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, in two separate engagements south of Gia Ray, accounted for four enemy KIA. On 11 January, Company B, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry engaged five enemy southwest of Gia Ray resulting in two enemy KIA and two individual weapons captured. Additional contacts in the area south and southwest of Gia Ray resulted in an additional ten enemy KIA during the week. The 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry continued to operate in northeastern Long Khanh Province. On 12 January, Company D, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry was engaged by an estimated eight enemy north of the La Nga River, resulting in four US WHA, one enemy KIA and one AK-47 captured. The 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry continued operations in its AO. On 11 January, Company C, 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry accounted for one enemy KIA when it engaged a small enemy force west of Gia Kiem. Troop D, 17th Armored Cavalry continued OPCON to the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry. Company M (Ranger), 75th Infantry continued ranger operations in the La Nga River Base area, accounting for one enemy KIA on 11 January. Troop C, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry (DS) continued operations in the TAOI.

(1) 17-23 January 1970: The 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry continued operations in southwestern Long Khanh Province and in the FRIENDSHIP III operational area. Troop D, 1st Squadron, 11th ACR continued OPCON to the 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry until 19 January. The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry continued operations in southern and eastern Long Khanh Province. Company D, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry was OPCON to the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry during the period 17-19 January. On 17 January, Company B, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry's operations southwest of Gia Ray resulted in four enemy KIA. During the week, units from the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry located an additional 21 enemy KIA from previous contacts south of Gia Ray. The 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry continued operations in its AO. On 19 January, the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry (-) conducted an airmobile assault into the area south of Vo Dat and Xo Xu in Binh Tuy Province. The battalion conducted extensive reconnaissance operations in conjunction with elements of the 52d ARVN Regiment. Troop D, 1st Squadron, 11th ACR participated in this operation, becoming OPCON to the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry effective 19 January 1970. Operations during the week resulted in one enemy KIA. The 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry continued operations in west-central Long Khanh Province. On 17 January, a sniper team from the 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry engaged and killed one enemy east of Bau Ham. Troop D, 17th Armored Cavalry conducted maintenance stand-down during the period 17-20 January 1970. The troop (-) conducted operations OPCON to the 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry with one platoon OPCON to the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, effective 20 January 1970. Company M (Ranger), 75th Infantry conducted ranger operations in the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry's AO until 21 January. Ranger teams commenced operations in the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry's AO effective 22 January 1970, locating 200 60mm mortar rounds and 50 Chicom grenades in an arms cache east of Gia Ray. Troop C, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry (DS) continued operations in

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support of brigade and RVNAF operations in the TAOI.

(m) 25-31 January 1970: The 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry continued operations in southwestern Long Khanh Province and in the FRIENDSHIP III operational area. On 27 January a platoon from Company B, 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry conducted airmobile operations west of FSB BLACKHORSE in Long Khanh Province. The platoon was engaged by an estimated 10 enemy resulting in one US WHA. The 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry continued operations in southern and eastern Long Khanh Province and in the FRIENDSHIP III operational area. On 27 January, Company B, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry engaged 4-5 enemy while conducting operations southeast of Xuan Loc resulting in three enemy KIA. Company D, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry engaged and killed two enemy on operations south of FSB MACE. On 28 January, while on operations south of Highway #1, Company B, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry killed eight enemy. On 29 January, Company B, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry found a cache containing 200 pounds of rice and other foodstuffs, killing one enemy in the same area. Troop D, 1st Squadron, 11th ACR became OPCON to the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry at FSB MACE to conduct an operational stand-down until 31 January. On 31 January Company D, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry found one enemy body (KIA) from a previous contact south of FSB MACE. The 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry continued to conduct operations in its AO. On 25 January, the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry conducted operations southeast of Vo Dat resulting in three US KIA, three US WHA and 1 enemy KIA. Caches containing 600 pounds of rice and other foodstuffs, one 60mm mortar tube, 6,600 rounds of AK ammunition and other assorted ordnance were found in the area. On 26-27 January, Company C, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry was OPCON to the 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry. On 28 January, Company D, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry engaged six enemy, killing three while on ground operations south of Xo Xu. On 30 January, Company D, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry discovered a cache containing seven shot guns, 14 S&S rifles, seven sub-machineguns, six M-1 rifles and six M-1 carbines. On 31 January, Company C, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry (-) was engaged by an enemy force of unknown size south of Xo Xu resulting in two US KIA and 26 US WHA, with two enemy KIA by tactical air support. The 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry continued combined and coordinated operations in western and central Long Khanh Province. On 25 January, Company B, 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry found a cache north of Highway #1 containing one 60mm mortar, 450 pounds of rice, 150 pounds of noodles, 60 pounds of candy and 40 pounds of salt. On 26 January, while conducting ground operations southeast of FSB LIBBY, Company A, 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry found a cache with forty 82mm mortar rounds, one 500 pound bomb and one M-60 machinegun. On 27 January, Company B, 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry, on ground operations south of FSB LIBBY found four enemy bodies (KIA) from a previous contact. Recon, 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry was engaged by an unknown number of enemy north of Highway #1 resulting in three US WHA. Company C, 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry engaged two enemy north of Highway #1 resulting in one US WHA and one enemy KIA. On 29 January, Company C, 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry, operating north of Highway #1, found one enemy KIA from a previous contact. On 31 January, an unknown number of enemy engaged Company C, 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry while they were on

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ground reconnaissance operations north of Highway #1 resulting in five US WHA and two enemy KIA. Troop D, 17th Armored Cavalry (-), OPCON to the 2nd Battalion, 3d Infantry, conducted reconnaissance operations. On 26 January, west of FSB BLACKHORSE, Troop D, 17th Armored Cavalry (-) was engaged by a command detonated mine resulting in four US WHA and one M113A1 destroyed. On 28 January, the platoon of Troop D, 17th Armored Cavalry OPCON to the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry found one enemy body (KIA) from a previous contact south of FSB MACE. Company M (Ranger), 75th Infantry conducted operations in the western sector of the brigade area of operations during 26-31 January. Troop C, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry (DS) continued operations in support of brigade, 18th ARVN Division and territorial forces.

#### (4) Training Activities:

(a) The following personnel were trained at REDCATCHER Combat Training Center (RCTC) during the period 1 November 1969 through 31 January 1970:

UNIT	NUMBER TRAINED	
	EM	OFF
199th LIB	1,228	78
54th Artillery Group	197	
1st Signal Brigade	147	
II Field Force, Vietnam (II FFV)	68	
HHC, Long Binh Post	12	
398th Transportation	47	
90th Replacement	11	
44th Medical Brigade	123	
222nd Aviation Group	168	
TOTALS	2,001	78

(b) The Brigade Mobile Training Team (MTT) continued its mission of general training support until it was dissolved on 16 January. The MTT was dissolved in order to effect more efficient utilization of personnel assigned to the brigade and to conduct more timely instruction.

1 Companies possess the capability to conduct training for themselves during periods when they are not participating in combat operations and can conduct more valid training than an external training element because unit

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commanders are in a position to evaluate operational performance and prepare instruction to overcome demonstrated weaknesses. Unit commanders are familiar with the personnel of the unit and can gear instruction to match the capabilities and limitations of the personnel. Because external training elements serve many units they are not always capable of satisfying requirements on a timely basis.

2 When separate teams not authorized by MTOE are organized they must draw personnel from authorized staff positions or maneuver units. Drawing personnel from authorized positions reduces the effectiveness of the affected staff section or maneuver unit.

(c) The Reciprocal Mobile Training Team (RMTT) conducted training for the 18th and the 43d Intelligence and Reconnaissance companies of the 18th ARVN Division. The training period for each company was two weeks and an operation was conducted to evaluate the training. Instruction consisted of weapons training, small unit tactics, leadership, map reading, land navigation, communications and artillery and air support. Because 18th ARVN Division units were committed to operations, no additional companies were trained.

(d) Hamlet and Territorial Forces Upgrading Teams of the maneuver battalions conducted training for 9 previously untrained RF Companies and retrained 3 additional RF Companies. Further, the teams conducted training for 45 previously untrained PF Platoons and retrained 35 other platoons.

(e) RF/PF units require constant retraining. Due to the nature of their mission, which is usually static defense, the individual soldiers seldom have the opportunity to fire their weapons. Periodically each RF/PF soldier should be required to confirm the battle sight zero of his weapon.

## (5) Chemical Operations:

(a) PERSONNEL DETECTOR: During the period thirty-five People Sniffer missions were flown over the brigade AO. All missions were flown using helicopters from Troop C, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry with a cobra gunship for cover. The 503d Chemical Detachment continues to maintain records of all sniffer missions for use by the command group, S-2 and S-3 personnel. Concurrent with the People Sniffer missions, aerial leaflet drops were made targeting trails, hot-spots and open areas.

(b) HERBICIDE OPERATIONS: During the quarter ending 31 January, eight herbicide operations were conducted by the 503d Chemical Detachment. A power driven decontamination apparatus (PDDA) was used on four missions using a total of 2,400 gallons of 12 1/2 percent herbicide "white" around the BMB perimeter. Three missions were conducted using hand sprayers around the perimeter of BMB, FSB LIBBY and the Crip Platoon outposts using a 20 percent solution of herbicide "white". One mission was conducted using a Mitey Mite, M106, on Hill 837 in support of the radio outpost. A total of 100 gallons of herbicide "orange" was used on Signal Mountain.

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(c) RIOT CONTROL AGENTS: During the quarter ending 31 January 1970, three E-158 CS air drops were conducted by the 503d Chemical Detachment. A total of 11 E-158 CS clusters were used. No persistent CS (CS I and CS II) was used during the reporting period.

(d) INSECTICIDE OPERATIONS: During the period, five insecticide operations were conducted by aerial spraying. All missions were flown by the 20th Preventive Medicine Unit. The 503d Chemical Detachment continues to control Malathion Insecticide distribution for the fogging devices and hand sprayers used by the brigade.

(e) INSPECTIONS: During the quarter a total of 21 CMMI and technical inspections were conducted by the 503d Chemical Detachment for the brigade.

(f) FLAME FIELD EXPEDIENTS: All Flame Field Expedients were replaced around the BMB perimeter. A total of 56 fougasses using 55-gallon drums and 20 fougasses using five gallon containers were installed and armed, accounting for 1,500 manhours.

## (6) Air Operations:

(a) United States Air Force: The US Air Force supported the brigade with close tactical air support and with shadow aircraft for surveillance and engagement of targets at night. The decrease in the number of airstrikes conducted during the reporting period is the result of fewer lucrative targets and the reduced number of sorties allocated to the brigade.

(b) During the reporting period, the US Air Force supported the brigade in the following manner:

### 1 Air Strikes Requested:

a Preplanned:	135
b Immediate:	59
c Combat skypots:	<u>None available</u>
d TOTAL	194

### 2 Air Strikes Approved:

a Preplanned:	116
b Immediate:	59
c Combat skypots:	None available
d Diverts:	<u>23</u>
e TOTAL:	198

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## 3 Bomb Damage Assessment:

	<u>DESTROYED</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>	<u>UNCOVERED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
a Bunkers	544	87	20	651
b Hootches	85			85
c Fighting Positions	35			35
d Trench Line (Meters)	105		180	285
e Bridges	1			1
f Killed By Air (KBA)				9
g Secondary Explosions				62
h Secondary Fires				34

(c) Army Aviation: The 199th Brigade Aviation Section performed missions during the period as follows:

<u>TYPE AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>HOURS FLOWN</u>	<u>SORTIES FLOWN</u>	<u>PAX HAULED</u>	<u>TONS OF CARGO</u>
UH1H	1,324	1,440	1,990	124
OH6A	1,509	1,328	1,554	21
TOTAL:	2,833	2,768	2,544	145

During the quarter, hours flown showed a substantial increase. Sorties, Pax and Cargo showed a slight decrease as more aircraft time was utilized for visual reconnaissance missions. Maintenance availability showed a decrease due to major combat damages sustained.

### e. Logistical, Transportation and Engineer Activities.

(1) During the quarter the Brigade S-4 section supported Operation RANSOM RAIDER, a combined cordon and search. The section was responsible for establishing and maintaining the combined holding and interrogation center (CHIC). Through coordination with the Brigade Supply Officer, the 87th Engineer Company and the 313th Signal Company, the land was leveled, the perimeter was established, communications were installed and supplies were issued. During the operation, the S-4 supervised the mess operation and the general housekeeping activities.

(2) The S-4 coordinated and supervised the resupply operations for two engineer companies conducting Rome plow operations in Long Khanh Province. The 60th and the 501st Engineer Companies of the 62nd Engineer Battalion operated for 45 and 30 day periods respectively. The companies were resupplied on a daily basis by air. Rations, repair parts, POL, and

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water were trucked to a convenient highway location and then hooked by CH-47 to the night defensive position. Mechanical failure or priority missions sometimes precluded the aircraft from accomplishing the resupply on schedule, but all resupply was eventually completed.

(3) On 4 January 1970, Troop D, 1st Squadron, 11th ACR was attached to the 199th Infantry Brigade. As a result, several logistical problems were encountered. The brigade did not have sufficient refueling facilities, so field expedient tankers were made by placing two 600 gallon pods and a pump on a 2½ ton truck. Maintenance personnel qualified in tracked vehicles, as well as PLL for the M48A3 Tanks were non-existent in the brigade. Therefore it was necessary to utilize the direct support facilities of the 185th Maintenance Battalion of the Saigon Support Command who stationed a contact team at Xuan Loc.

(4) The deadline rates for 10kw generators and 2½ ton trucks were considerably higher than normal during the quarter. There was a critical shortage of gasoline engines for the generators. The majority of the brigade's dump trucks were deadlined at one time because of cracked flex tubes on the exhaust systems. These parts were also short in supply and were requisitioned through red ball channels.

(5) The brigade continued to rely on the assets of the 1st Platoon, 120th Transportation Company, 48th Transportation Group, for tactical transportation support. When required, additional vehicles were requested through Saigon Support Command.

(6) The following supplies were issued by the 7th Combat Support Battalion:

(a) Class I:

1 Tons of "A" rations issued:	1,093.4
2 Tons of "C" rations issued:	335.5
3 TOTAL:	1,428.9
4 Weekly average:	109.9
5 Pounds of ice:	1,923,680.0
6 Sundry packs issued:	2,841.0

(b) Class II and IV:

1 Requisitions received:	18,066.0
2 Requisitions filled:	10,359.0

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3 Demand accommodation: 93.1%

4 Average number received per week: 1,389.7

(c) Class III:

1 Gallons issued: 1,151,624.0

2 Average weekly issue: 88,586.4

(d) Class V:

1 Tons drawn: 3,926.6

2 Average tons drawn weekly: 302.0

(e) The following is the current supply status of the brigade:

1 Class I:

	<u>Storage Capacity</u>	<u>On-hand</u>
a "A" rations	15 days	10 days
b "C" rations	180,000 units	125,000 units
2 Class III		
a JP-4	20,000 gals	20,000 gals
b Mogas	24,800 gals	24,800 gals
c Diesel	12,400 gals	12,400 gals

3 Class V: Portions of each unit's basic load are stored in the Brigade Ammunition Dump.

(7) Major items of supply obtained for the brigade:

(a) Weapons:

1 Machinegun 7.62mm M-60	20
2 Rifle 5.56mm M16A1	152
3 Pistol cal .45 M1911A1	3
4 Grenade launcher 40mm M-79	3
5 Flame thrower, portable	29

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6 Recoilless rifle M-76	1
7 Mortar, 4.2 inch	3
(b) Mobility:	
1 Truck utility, $\frac{1}{2}$ ton, M151A1	31
2 Truck, $\frac{3}{4}$ ton, M-37	16
3 Personnel carrier M-113A1	4
4 Truck, cargo, $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton	7
5 Trailer water, 400 gallon	6
6 Truck, ambulance $\frac{1}{2}$ ton	1
7 Trailer, $\frac{1}{2}$ ton	4
8 Trailer, $\frac{3}{4}$ ton	2
9 Armored reconnaissance airborne assault vehicle M-551	1
10 Armored car, XV-100	2
11 Fork lift, 6,000 pound capacity	2
(c) Communication:	
1 Telephone TA-312/U	6
2 Radio transmitter AN/PRT-4A	5
3 Receiver AN/PRR-9	15
4 Radio set AN/GRC-160	3
5 Radio set AN/PRC-77	32
(d) TOE	
1 Bulldozer, D-7	1
2 Generator set .3kw	5
3 Chain saw	10
4 Miniscope AN/PVS-2	14

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5	Launcher bridge (AVLB)	1
6	Tent GP medium	6
7	Generator set 10kw	3
8	Scoop loader	2
9	Compass lensatic/magnetic	178
10	Compressor 5cfm	6
11	Generator 60kw	1
12	Tank and pump unit	1
13	Searchlight, nighthawk	1
14	Binoculars 6 x 30	55
15	Water purification unit	1
16	Mine detector	6
17	Refrigerator 65 cubic feet	4
18	Typewriter, electric	3
19	Pump 100gpm	1
20	Computer FADAC	1

(8) The following is a list of the major engineering activities in the forward area accomplished by the 87th Engineer Company, 199th Infantry Brigade from 1 November 1969 thru 31 January 1970:

- (a) Construction of one company size FSB to include construction of the berm, perimeter fence, bunkers, showers, and latrines.
- (b) Construction of one dispensary for the 18th ARVN Division at Xuan Loc.
- (c) Construction of the perimeter and interior fencing for the CHIC compound on a cordon operation.
- (d) Reconstruction of the forward conference room at Xuan Loc.
- (e) Construction of a grease rack at Xuan Loc.
- (f) Enlargement of two 1 ship LZ's to 3 ship LZ/PZ's.

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- (g) Grading and raising of 1km of road on QL 20.
- (h) Grading of 400m of road on LTL 2.
- (i) Construction of the following bridges:
  - 1 Permanent:
    - a 1 timber trestle class 60, 24 foot span.
    - b 1 timber trestle class 30, 24 foot span.
    - c 1 timber trestle class 26, 92 foot span.
  - 2 Tactical:
    - a 1 M4T6 dry span class 60, 30 foot span.
    - b 1 M4T6 dry span class 60, 45 foot span.
- (9) The following major activities were accomplished at Camp Frenzell-Jones:
  - (a) Upgrading of the EMB parade ground.
  - (b) Construction and repair of EMB perimeter bunkers.
  - (c) Repair of the roof on the REDCATCHER Training Center classroom.
- (10) Summary of Engineer Operations in Forward areas: Various squads and pieces of heavy equipment are in continuous direct support of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry; 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry; 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry; 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry; 2nd Battalion, 40th Artillery; Troop D, 17th Armored Cavalry; all of the 199th Infantry Brigade. The engineer company provides demolition and mine detector teams and performs general engineer support such as the construction and repairing of bunkers, mess halls, perimeter defense, and landing pads; the clearing of firing lanes and landing zones and the upgrading and construction of forward roads.
- f. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations.
  - (1) Civil Affairs and Psychological operations during the reporting period were directed toward the following goals:
    - (a) Supporting the final objectives of the 1969 Accelerated Pacification Plan, and the initial phases of the 1970 Pacification Plan.
    - (b) Improving the health and welfare of the population, the dependents of Regional Forces, RVNAF and para military forces.

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(c) Continuing to improve community relations.

(d) Improving the capabilities and responsiveness of RF's and PF's.

(2) By the end of 1969 all objectives of the Accelerated Pacification Plan were accomplished and in most cases performance exceeded the goals established. Security of the population decreased slightly with insignificant effects on the overall pacification goals. The accomplishments in the major areas of pacification are as follows:

## OBJECTIVE

STATUS 31 Jan 70

(a) Continue to improve security of the population to relatively secure (A, B or C rating) and improve the security of hamlets to provide a secure environment both day and night (A or B rating) to 65% of the population.

97.8% of the population lives in relatively secure hamlets; this is a 2.2% drop from 31 Oct 69. However, 78.9% of the population lives in hamlets secure both day and night. 2.2% of the population lives in contested hamlets.

(b) Eliminate or neutralize 58 hard core VCI.

52 VCI were eliminated or neutralized.

(c) Induce 39 Hoi Chanhs to rally to GVN.

76 Hoi Chanhs rallied.

(d) Improve Popular Self Defense Forces.

PSDF recruited 16,400; trained 13,400; armed 4,100.

(3) The Civic Action program was designed to accomplish the following:

(a) Improve the security of the populated areas.

(b) Improve the health and welfare of the population.

(c) Improve the attitude of the population and support the psychological objectives.

(d) Continue to improve the civic action performance of RVNAF and provincial elements to provide for continuity of the civic action support of the populace after the relocation of the 199th LIB.

(4) Description of primary civic actions projects, reason for success and method employed:

(a) Youth Program: The Brigade assisted in the construction of a tennis and volley ball court in Xuan Loc, which is used for sports competition. Elements of the brigade assisted the education program by distributing school kits and furnishing materials to repair 35 schools.

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(b) Voluntary Agency Accounts: Assistance was given to the 18th ARVN Division to establish their own account with Catholic Relief Society. This arrangement provides for these services without further assistance and insures an adequate program will continue to be conducted to support ARVN, RF and PF widows.

(c) Medical Civic Action: Medical civic actions continued to be a major part of the brigade's civic action program. Through Integrated Civic Action Program (ICAP) operations over 5,000 persons were inoculated against small pox and polio, which averted a possible epidemic in Ho Nai and Gia Kiem Villages. The ICAPs conducted have resulted in an increase in the civilian population supporting the GVN and in intelligence being gained from the populace.

(d) Assistance to the Long Khanh Chieu Hoi Center: The brigade continued to assist the Chieu Hoi Center by conducting Medical Civic Action Programs (MEDCAPS), English classes, distribution of food, and materials for repair of the facilities.

(e) Training of Medical Personnel: The brigade medical section continues to train medical personnel at the Xuan Loc Provincial Hospital, Long Khanh Province, and at the Ho Nai Hospital in Bien Hoa Province.

(f) English Instruction to Employees and Students: The brigade continued to conduct English Language training. This off duty teaching by volunteer personnel is conducted in two locations for a total of four classes per week. This program continues to develop a better understanding between the RVN local population and the US forces.

(g) Psychological Operations:

1 Psychological operations conducted by the brigade during the period were increased. PSYOP activities conducted were in coordination with Long Khanh Province and the 18th ARVN Division.

2 PSYOP activities continued to place emphasis on the Chieu Hoi Program, pacification, and the Voluntary Informant Program. Quick reaction exploitation of Hoi Chanhs remained the most effective PSYOP weapon directed against the VC/NVA. The Hoi Chanh rate continued to be excellent with the established goals being exceeded by over 100%.

3 Utilization of audio-visual (HE) and loudspeaker (HB) PSYOP teams and Armed Propaganda Teams (APT) in the hamlets in support of the pacification program was effective in promoting the image of the GVN and instilling confidence in the government among the people. All PSYOP programs are promoted using leaflets, aerial and ground broadcasts, motion pictures and face to face communication.

4 PSYOP program priorities for targeting during the period were:

a The 274th VC Regiment and SR-4 elements.

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b Operation FAMILY TREE targeting Headquarters MR-7 and Headquarters 33d NVA Regiment.

c Local force elements.

d The local population (to build the GVN image and to break accommodation with the enemy forces).

## (5) Statistical Summary:

### (a) Civic Action:

1 MEDCAP/ICAP operations:	299
2 Patients treated:	32,330
2 English language classes:	32
4 English students:	952
5 Schools supported:	58
6 Doctors/nurses/nurses' aides trained:	221
7 Orphanages supported:	13
8 Roads constructed (kilometers):	5
9 Roads repaired (kilometers):	16
10 Hospitals repaired:	2
11 Dispensaries constructed:	3
12 Dispensaries repaired:	7
13 ARVN quarters constructed:	8
14 Construction supplies distributed:	
a Cement (pounds):	80,100
b Lumber (board feet):	22,100
c Roofing tin (sheets):	809
d Paint (gallons):	77
e Engineer stakes:	2,715

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f Barbed wire (rolls):	2,140
g Bricks:	7,000
h Sandbags:	14,200
i Culvert (cubic meters):	577
j Perforated steel planking (PSP)(planks):	80
k Sand (cubic meters):	400
l Fencing (meters):	1,600
15 Food distributed (pounds):	105,350
16 Kits distributed; 45% health, 55% school:	5,840
17 Clothing distributed (pounds):	5,353
(b) Psychological Operations:	
1 Total PSYOP missions:	3,355
2 Total quick reaction missions:	1,413
3 Total leaflets dropped:	30,200,000
4 Total aerial missions with organic assets:	1,277
5 Total ground broadcasting (hours):	587
6 Total aerial broadcasting (hours):	266
7 Total Armed Propaganda Team (APT) operations:	194
8 Target themes used; number of times used:	
a Chieu Hoi Program:	5,207
b Pacification support:	1,916
c Tactical support:	4,732
d Volunteer informant program:	2,641
9 Total leaflets designed:	56
10 Total posters designed:	6

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11 Total tapes produced:

31

(6) Results achieved:

(a) Our pacification results in Long Khanh Province continue to improve. The support of the local population has increased towards the GVN. The local population continues to report on enemy activity.

(b) The 18th ARVN Division continues to improve their PSYOP in targeting the local populace and local and main force enemy units.

(c) Long Khanh Province continues to improve their PSYOP by building the image of the GVN through daily face to face communications.

g. Fire Support Coordinator.

(1) During the past quarter, the 2nd Battalion, 40th Artillery fired a total of 95,275 rounds. Intelligence targets accounted for 44.1% of the total rounds fired. The batteries of the battalion made 37 displacements during this quarter in support of brigade operations.

(2) To provide necessary support to the infantry units, the battalion operated from as many as eight fire support bases simultaneously.

(3) There was one artillery raid during this quarter utilizing two 175mm guns. The raid was on an extremely large bunker complex in the northern portion of the TAOI resulting in numerous bunkers destroyed.

(4) The 199th LIB, 18th ARVN Division and Long Khanh Province forces have established a combined fire support coordination center. This center enables both FVMAF and ARVN elements' requests for support by artillery, Air Force and Army aviation to be more expeditiously processed than was previously possible.

(5) An SCP was established to provide for the marking of bunker complexes and for determining their exact location by registration and replot. This will enable supporting elements to accurately locate and engage these targets in the future.

h. Signal.

(1) The brigade command posts remained static during the previous quarter. Radio relay systems are portrayed in Inclosure 2, Radio Relay Systems Diagram as of 31 January 1970.

(2) A regenerative repeater HYL-3/TSEC-NESTOR was installed on Hill 837 on 20 November 1969 for automatic retransmission of the Brigade Command Net (Secure). This additional capability of the 313th Signal Company replaced the previous requirement for operator relay.

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(3) Command emphasis on the use of authorized codes was increased during January 1970. Use of unauthorized codes to include point of origin codes, shackle and coding of grid squares was expressly forbidden in an effort to gain greater security for brigade operations.

(4) The brigade communication posture on 31 January 1970 was as follows:

(a) Radio Relay Systems:

1 The diagram at Inclosure 2 outlines the system utilized to provide command and control means via telephone and teletype to all battalion fire support bases. The 313th Signal Company operated the brigade VHF system at Xuan Loc, FSB BLACKHORSE, FSB MACE, FSB NANCY and FSB LIBBY.

2 The 53d Signal Battalion terminated VHF radio relay and HF radio teletype (RATT) from II FFV to the 199th Infantry Brigade forward CP at Xuan Loc.

(b) Radio:

- 1 Brigade Forward CP at Xuan Loc:
  - a Brigade Command Net-FM (Non-Secure).
  - b Brigade Command Net-FM (Secure).
  - c II FFV Command Net-FM (Non-Secure).
  - d II FFV Command Net -FM (Secure).
  - e Brigade Fire Control Net-FM (Non-Secure).
  - f 199th Aviation Command Net-FM (Non-Secure).
  - g ALO Nets FM, AM, UHF (USAF)(Secure).
  - h Air Mobile Monitor UHF (Non-Secure).
  - i Brigade Command Net-SSB (Non-Secure).
  - j Forward Area Security Net-FM (Non-Secure).
- 2 Brigade Rear TOC at Camp Frenzell-Jones:
  - a Brigade Command Net-FM (Non-Secure).
  - b Brigade Command Net-FM (Secure).
  - c Brigade Command Net-SSB (Non-Secure).

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- d II FFV Command Net-FM (Non-Secure).
- e II FFV Command Net-FM (Secure).
- f Rear Area Security Net-FM (Non-Secure).
- 3 Infantry Battalions:

a Each infantry battalion operated a Command Net-FM (Non-Secure), a Battalion Command Net-FM (Secure), a Clear to Fire Net (Non-Secure) and a Logistics Net-FM (Non-Secure). AN/VRC-24 UHF radios were utilized for air mobile operations (except 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry).

b Each infantry company operated a Command Net-FM (Non-Secure).

## 4 Artillery Battalion:

a The 2nd Battalion, 40th Artillery operated a Command Net and monitored Battery Fire Direction Nets as required. An FM transmission station was operated at Gia Ray for communication with FSB MACE.

b Continuing emphasis was placed on the NESTOR program in the 2nd Battalion, 40th Artillery. Cables for interconnecting the KY38/TSEC and RT 524 has permitted increased secure voice transmission in the battalion. Range limitations of the AN/PRC 77-KY38 have limited implementation of secure voice.

## (c) Wire and Cables:

1 Wire and multi-pair cable were employed for local distribution within the command posts and perimeter security lines. Spiral-4 cable was used to connect the special quality data terminal to the Xuan Loc area signal center.

2 Manually operated SB22 and SB86 boards dismantled from Central Office Telephone Manual AN/MTC-7 units were employed throughout the brigade. Dial service at Camp Frenzell-Jones was provided by the Plantation Signal Company (Provisional), 36th Signal Battalion. A limited number of dial phones were operated at the Xuan Loc forward CP by the area signal center, 36th Signal Battalion.

## (d) Communications Center:

1 The Brigade Rear Communications Center at Camp Frenzell-Jones utilized one AN/MGC-34 Teletype Central Office. The equipment was dismantled and installed in the rear TOC in December 1969 to terminate one HDX on-line circuit to the brigade forward CP.

2 The Brigade Forward Communications Center used two AN/MGC-17 Teletype Central Office (dismounted) to terminate one HDX on-line circuit from II FFV and one HDX on-line circuit from brigade rear.

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2 The on-line Tactical Teletype system was operated from the forward brigade TOC to each infantry battalion FSB.

(e) Message Center and Courier:

1 Scheduled message service operated twice daily between brigade rear and forward (313th Signal Company).

2 A scheduled air courier was operated between brigade forward and the infantry battalion FSB's.

(5) Power: PA&E provided principal power sources at brigade forward and rear. Backup power to each system was provided with organic 3, 5 and 10 kilowatt generators. Primary power at FSB's was provided with 5 and 10 kilowatt generators.

1. Public and Command Information.

(1) Continued emphasis was given to the Army Hometown News Program, resulting in maintenance of a high level of releases.

(2) The number of press visits from outside news media increased with the approach of the holiday season. The press evinced continued interest in the Vietnamization program, specifically in the brigade pacification program and the upgrading of the 18th ARVN Division. The major US television networks (CBS, NBC and ABC), the German television network and the Japanese television network (NHK) came to the 199th for material. Other visits were made by Newsweek, The Los Angeles Times, SEAPAC and the Department of the Army Special Photo Team.

(3) The second edition of the REDCATCHER Yearbook, the brigade magazine, was edited and prepared for printing. The contract for printing is being coordinated by USARV Central Purchasing Agency. Funds of \$7,000 have been approved by USARV Central Welfare Fund. The magazine will go to press as soon as a contract is awarded.

(4) Publication of the twice-monthly REDCATCHER newspaper continued. A contract was arranged with Stars and Stripes in Tokyo to resume printing of the newspaper beginning in February 1970. At this time the layout and production of the REDCATCHER newspaper has been transferred from the commercial printing firm of Toshu Printing Company in Tokyo to new facilities at the MACV Information Office. The cost per issue will be reduced from \$361.00 to \$191.00.

(5) Publication of the weekly REDCATCHER Newsletter continued, with the schedule occasionally interrupted by the lack of the necessary printing plates.

(6) More frequent publication of news released for outside publication resulted from slight readjustment of personnel assignments within the information office. Closer quality control of releases has resulted in nearly

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100% outside use of material submitted from this office.

(7) A small vehicle van body has been converted into a minimal photo laboratory for processing black and white film and printing small quantities of photographs at Xuan Loc. This has resulted in shorter delays in photo distribution, and this timely distribution has resulted in increased publication of photo releases.

(8) Closer contact between brigade and battalion information personnel has resulted in a more consistent quality of releases to outside media and expanded coverage of all units.

(9) The following is a breakdown of information office activities during the reporting period:

(a) News Media Visits: 15

(b) Hometown News Releases:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>RELEASES</u>	<u>PICTURES</u>	<u>RADIO</u>
November 1969	471	187	145
December 1969	589	211	210
January 1970	<u>695</u>	<u>209</u>	<u>42</u>
TOTALS:	1,755	607	395

(c) Hard News Releases:

	<u>RELEASES</u>	<u>PICTURES</u>	<u>RADIO</u>
November 1969	180	130	4
December 1969	248	280	4
January 1970	<u>255</u>	<u>211</u>	<u>4</u>
TOTALS:	683	621	12

j. Staff Judge Advocate.

(1) On 4 November 1969, Captain John A. Fox was added to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate. On 9 November 1969, Captain Richard C. Tufaro joined the SJA staff. Both were detailed to act as counsel for trials of special courts-martial. They replaced Captain Chris P. Ledwidge and Captain Leon S. Soroker. On 14 January 1970, Captain David A. Bengtson replaced Captain Thomas C. Hokinson as the Brigade Staff Judge Advocate.

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(2) During the reporting period this command paid \$1,166.00 in personal property claims to U.S. military personnel. The breakdown is as follows:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>CLAIMS</u>	<u>AMOUNT PAID</u>
November 1969	5	\$ 394.00
December 1969	3	153.00
January 1970	<u>5</u>	<u>619.00</u>
TOTALS:	13	\$1,166.00

(3) The breakdown of non-judicial punishment imposed during the reporting period is as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
2/3 Inf	11	6	24	41
3/7 Inf	8	10	15	33
4/12 Inf	17	17	11	45
5/12 Inf	12	20	14	46
2/40 Arty	12	8	26	46
7th Spt Bn	31	31	34	96
Trp D, 17th Cav	0	5	2	7
87th Engr	2	0	6	8
313th Sig	2	1	5	8
HHC, 199th LIB	4	10	21	35
75 Inf, 49 SD, 76 CTT	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>5</u>
TOTALS:	99	110	161	370

(4) The following is a breakdown of the special courts-martial convened during the reporting period. There were no summary courts-martial convened during the period. Two of the special courts-martial reported during December for 5th Battalion, 12th Infantry resulted in Bad Conduct Discharges and were adjudged at II Field Force, Vietnam.

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
2/3 Inf	2	2	3	7
3/7 Inf	0	2	1	3
4/12 Inf	0	0	0	0
5/12 Inf	3	5	1	9
2/40 Arty	2	1	0	3
7th Spt Bn	1	0	2	3
313th Sig	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTALS:	8	10	8	26

(5) Activities in the whole field of legal assistance handled by the Staff Judge Advocate's Office during the reporting period are as follows:

	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Adoption and change of name	5	1	4	10
Citizenship	8	3	12	23
Civil rights	7	6	4	17
Domestic relations	17	14	19	50
Depositions	0	9	5	14
Non-Support	5	2	1	8
Notarizations	14	8	18	40
Personal finances	14	6	9	29
Personal property	5	2	4	11
Powers of attorney	12	10	18	40
Real property	0	1	3	4
Taxation	4	4	9	17
Torts	0	3	0	3
Wills and estates	4	6	8	18

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	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Miscellaneous	<u>42</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>164</u>
TOTALS:	137	120	191	448

## k. Provost Marshal.

(1) During this reporting period all security guard towers were sandbagged for additional security. Also, two bunkers were built adjacent to Check Point Alpha to further fortify that area.

(2) During the period 23-28 November 1969 the Provost Marshal's Office participated in a cordon and search of Bau Ham Village, YT 2912.

(3) On 16 January 1970 the Combat Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon (CRIP) ceased operations and was de-activated.

(4) During November 1969 two XV-100 Armored Commando Cars were acquired to increase the security of escorted convoys.

(5) In December and January, new locking gates and security lights were installed at Checkpoints Alpha and Bravo, thereby affording greater security during the hours of darkness. In addition, sandbagged fighting positions were built on top of bunkers at these points and M-60 machine-guns are manned there during the hours of darkness.

(6) A drop-bar gate has been erected at Checkpoint Bravo to assist in the control of traffic and insure a 100% inspection of all vehicles.

(7) In January 1970, through coordination with the USARV Highway Traffic Control Section, Long Binh, a traffic patrol was implemented in an effort to control vehicular movement on Highways 316, QL #1 and to reduce hazards which cause accidents.

(8) During the period several formal periods of instruction were conducted by personnel of this office for supervisory personnel within the brigade in an effort to reduce the incidence of marihuana and dangerous drug usage. The instruction dealt primarily with the supervisor's role in the surveillance, detection and identification of suspected users and suppliers. Further emphasis was placed on the "amnesty" program which guarantees medical assistance, with anonymity, for those who desire it.

(9) Following is a breakdown of work performed during this period:

(a) Traffic accidents investigated:	30
(b) Serious incident reports processed:	8
(c) Military Police reports initiated:	187

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(d) CID cases opened:	40
(e) Crime prevention surveys conducted:	13
(f) VIP security operations:	7
(g) Detainees and returnees processed:	7
(h) Number of PW's processed:	4

(10) There were a total of 457 convoys escorted for a total of 49,795 miles during this period.

## 1. Chaplain Activities.

(1) The Brigade Chaplain's section has had almost a complete turnover of personnel during this period. Chaplain (LTC) A. Allen Farrow returned to CONUS after a year with the brigade and was replaced by Chaplain (LTC) Trevor D. Turner. Chaplain (CPT) Angelo J. Liteky was transferred to the 44th Medical Brigade after four months with the brigade and was replaced by Chaplain (CPT) Kenneth J. Gilly. Chaplain (CPT) John J. Giammona returned to CONUS after four months with the brigade and was replaced by Chaplain (CPT) Charles B. Hagearty. Chaplain (CPT) Herbert H. Hicks was transferred to the 8th Transportation Group and was replaced by Chaplain (CPT) Kendrick A. Gould.

(2) The chapel program for the Thanksgiving and Christmas seasons received better response than has ever been possible since the brigade has been in Vietnam. This response was due to the excellent chapel facilities at HMB and the brigade forward area in Xuan Loc which provided opportunities for special services and musical programs. Radio coverage of the Christmas Eve services was broadcast throughout the brigade. Helicopter transportation was provided for chaplains at Thanksgiving and Christmas to make services available to every man even in the most remote areas.

(3) Religious and educational institutions in seven cities and hamlets of the AO were assisted by civic action projects with 1,789 children receiving gifts of clothing and candy which were distributed by the Brigade Chaplain's section.

(4) Statistical report for period 1 November 1969-31 January 1970:

<u>ATTENDANCE</u>		
(a) Number of services:	397	11,002
(b) Memorial services:	27	2,341
(c) Orientations:	28	1,725

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## ATTENDANCE

(d) Hospital visits:	106	1,755
(e) Counseling cases:	534	
(f) Letters to churches:	507	
(g) Letters of condolence:	53	

m. Finance. During the period, normal operations of the Brigade Finance Office were supplemented by the use of Finance Contact Teams with stand-down units returning to Camp Frenzell-Jones. The contact teams, consisting of two records clerks and an allotment clerk, are set up to allow each member of a stand-down unit the opportunity to review his records, correct any deficiencies, and initiate any pay or allotment changes. The teams are set up in a location separate from the Brigade Finance Office to minimize the disruption of office routine while affording each man maximum opportunity to review his records. During the three month period, 27 units were processed in this manner with no significant difficulty.

### n. Brigade Surgeon Activities.

(1) The health of the command showed an average admission rate of 253.1/1,000/annum. The non-effectiveness in respect to sick days revealed an average of 2.0 per day. This is a decrease of 0.6 per day from the last reporting quarter. The admission rate is substantially lower than last quarter due to a decrease in foot problems and malaria.

(2) Immunizations administered throughout the brigade reached an average of 2,975 per month during the recent quarter.

(3) The hepatitis rate during this quarter decreased. Only two cases were reported, one case in November and one in January.

#### (4) Malaria:

(a) The malaria rate decreased during this quarter from 142.3 cases/1,000/annum to 112.9/1,000/annum. During the last month of the quarter the rate fell to 94.8/1,000/annum. Despite this downward trend in malarial incidence, the rate of Vivax malaria has increased. This would appear to indicate the necessity for increased command emphasis in respect to ingestion of the Chloroquine-Primaquine tablet. Ingestion of this tablet provides almost 100% protection against Vivax malaria.

(b) During the past quarter, each battalion and small unit was required to submit their present and projected programs for malaria prevention. These were evaluated for completeness and to determine those areas which require increased emphasis. Review of each unit's program revealed a need for intensification of urine testing programs to determine whether personnel are taking the pill.

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## (5) Venereal Disease:

(a) The venereal disease rate increased from a quarterly average of 184.8/1,000/annum to 219.2/1,000/annum. Classes in VD were given by many of the units in hopes of educating the troops on the subject of possible future complications.

(b) To help with small unit venereal disease programs, the Brigade Surgeon's Office scheduled two movies during the month of January. In attempts to upgrade the venereal disease education program at the RED-CATCHER Training Center, the Preventive Medicine Section of this office presents a one-hour lecture weekly to newly arriving personnel.

(6) Foot Disease: Foot disease decreased dramatically during this quarter with the termination of the rainy season. The Command Health Reports during the months of August, September and October reported rates for both outpatient and inpatient cases. Outpatient cases were recorded because of the enormous amount of immersion foot which was being treated. During October there were 148 cases of immersion foot while in November only 19 cases were reported. Many of the cases during October were placed on quarters or hospitalized, demonstrating the severity of the problem. During November and throughout the quarter the dramatic decline in foot diseases paralleled the end of the rainy season.

(7) Drugs: Continued emphasis on troop education has been maintained during this recent quarter. In accordance with the announced policy of the Department of Defense in regards to marihuana and drug suppression, a program aimed at drug suppression was instituted throughout the brigade during this quarter. The main points of this program include quarterly orientation of all personnel and coordination of commanders at all levels along with chaplains, surgeons, the Staff Judge Advocate and the Provost Marshal in an attempt to establish an "amnesty" program, whereby personnel who may feel in need of assistance to stop their use of dangerous drugs may obtain help and guidance without fear of disciplinary action -- providing they are not under investigation at that time and do not become involved in the misuse of drugs subsequently.

## (8) Animal Bites:

(a) The incidence of animal bites decreased during the quarter. During the months of August, September and October, 8 dog bites and 13 rat bites were reported while during November, December and January only two dog bites and 6 rat bites were reported. The cleaning of trash points and the installation of new trash points in the BMB area have probably contributed to the decrease in the rat bites reported this quarter. Field sanitation teams are also required to inspect their areas to insure that P&E has provided adequate numbers of rat boxes.

(b) The Brigade Surgeon's Office instituted a Rabies Control Board during the month of November. The utilization of the Rabies Control Board has provided a positive means to monitor the animal bites within the bri-

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gade as well as to insure proper treatment of the bites. A new policy concerning rat bites recommended by USARV was discussed and instituted.

(9) Medical Care to Vietnamese Civilians: The health screening program instituted during July, August and September was continued during the reporting period. Health examinations are being maintained by the Vietnamese Labor Fund Custodian of each respective unit. The health exams are maintained on the housegirls employed on BMB. Immunizations are administered periodically to civilians working as kitchen help. Further medical care to Vietnamese civilians is provided through MEDCAPS.

(10) Medical Support for the HHC, 199th LIB and attached units: This consists of maintenance of medical records, immunizations and minor medical treatment. Many personnel of Brigade HHC and attached units consult with the Brigade Surgeon about individual medical problems as well as medical oriented problems within their units. The Brigade Surgeon's Office also provides medical personnel (field medics) to small units within the 199th LIB: three medics to Troop D, 17th Armored Cavalry; one medic to the CRIP Platoon and one to the security platoon on Nui Chua Chan (YT 6010). Medical supplies for these units are coordinated through the Brigade Surgeon's Office.

### (11) Field Sanitation:

(a) A new preventive medicine section was formed in the Brigade Surgeon's Office during the month of December. Its main functions are to monitor the field sanitation at the FSB's, monitor area sanitation at BMB and upgrade the field sanitation teams.

(b) Inspections of the mess halls at the different FSB's were completed by the Preventive Medicine Section, with the deficiencies brought to the attention of the battalion surgeons and commanders. At the present time, the Preventive Medicine Section is evaluating field sanitation at FSB's and establishing a schedule for upgrading field sanitation teams.

(c) The Preventive Medicine Section was instrumental in compiling pertinent information concerning the outbreak of gastroenteritis on Christmas Day 1969 at Xuan Loc.

### (12) Area Sanitation:

(a) Trash point areas have been cleaned and a new one installed behind the EM Club. The new point installed was constructed with a concrete floor and a drain system to insure cleanliness of the area. The septic tank adjacent to the EM Club is presently undergoing reconstruction.

(b) Monthly inspections of mess halls and weekly inspections of the Open Mess clubs, PX snack bar, barbershops, latrines, trash points and showers were continued. Due to the intensity of the inspections and strict enforcement of sanitary procedures, a marked improvement has been noted in these

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areas during this quarter.

(c) Self closing lids were installed on the latrines at FSB's LIBBY and MACE. Sixteen new urinals and 6 new latrines were constructed at the FSB's and at EMB.

## (13) Medical Statistics:

(a) This office compiles various medical reports necessary to evaluate the health of the command and the effectiveness of the medical sections. Among these reports are the Command Health Reports and MEDCAP Reports submitted monthly. In addition, weekly reports include the Skin and Infectious Disease report and Morbidity reports which provide information over a shorter period of time to enable better coordination among medical sections for control of disease.

(b) The Weekly Medical Report and Bi-monthly Medical Rosters were continued during this quarter. The Medical Report gives us a weekly summarization of problems encountered in the field which have not been resolved and preventive medicine projects initiated at battalion FSB's and battalion areas at EMB. The rosters include valuable information about each medic in the field and at rear echelon positions.

(14) Preventive Dentistry: In addition to the dental facility at EMB, the mobile dental van provided care at FSBs BLACKHORSE, NANCY, MACE, LIBBY and at Xuan Loc. At the EMB dental clinic, priorities are given to men who have to return to the field and those who are being discharged on return to CONUS.

## 2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

### a. Personnel.

(1) Command emphasis 1. continually required to prevent an increase in malaria.

(a) Observation: Despite an overall decrease in malarial incidence, the vivax rate has continued to increase.

### (b) Evaluation:

1 Subsequent to the termination of the rainy season, the malarial incidence within the brigade has shown a slow downward trend. Vivax cases, however, have continued to rise. In view of the intensive anti-malaria program established throughout the brigade during the past two quarters, a more significant decrease in overall rate as well as a decline in vivax malaria were expected. It would appear that increased command emphasis is necessary to enforce ingestion of the Chloroquine-Primaquine tablet which provides almost 100% protection against vivax.

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2 In the past, an attempt to control and monitor the ingestion of these tablets was provided by regularly performed urine testing for Chloroquine-Primaquine tablet residue. Although negative reports are sent to the Office of the Brigade Surgeon, it appears that not enough people are being tested; that testing materials are often allowed to expire without replenishment; that often, the same individuals are tested each week, rather than different personnel; and that occasionally tests are not performed as required. All of these factors result in inadequate monitoring of Chloroquine-Primaquine tablet ingestion and thereby allow many individuals to avoid taking the pill and at the same time not be detected.

(c) Recommendations: That increased command emphasis be placed on ingestion of the Chloroquine-Primaquine tablet. In order that this be accomplished in such a way so as to reduce the vivax malaria rate, an increased number of individuals should be tested weekly (100 men/battalion; 50 men/separate unit). The results of these tests should be forwarded to the Brigade Surgeon's Office. Those units evidencing greater than 4% negative tests (indicating lack of Chloroquine-Primaquine residue or that the Chloroquine-Primaquine tablet has not been taken) should be required to reply by indorsement to the Commanding General or his designated representative. When this occurs to the same unit on a second occasion, a letter indicating the Commanding General's concern should be forwarded to the commander of the unit involved. To insure that the urine tests are being performed as prescribed, an impartial team from the Brigade Surgeon's Office should periodically spot check units.

## b. Intelligence.

### (1) Marking Enemy Base Camps in Heavy Jungle Terrain.

(a) Observation: A system was needed for marking enemy base camps in heavy jungle terrain, in order to engage these targets at a later date.

(b) Evaluation: This was accomplished using colored parachutes to mark the target area using aerial assets. Recovered illumination parachutes were painted red and yellow and rigged with a ten pound weight by the 503d Chemical Detachment. The parachute is dropped 75 feet above the trees and the target can be spotted 10,000 meters from the target. Marked targets are kept on file with the 503d Chemical Detachment. The parachute marking system has additional advantages over smoke marking system for air strikes. Blade hours can be saved by the marking ship leaving the area after the target is marked.

(c) Recommendations: That this technique be used by other units in similar circumstances.

### (2) Searching Areas of Air Strikes.

(a) Observation: The rim of loose soil around bomb craters is used as an expedient grave site for enemy KIA.

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(b) Evaluation: Units searching a base camp discovered the bodies of two enemy KIA. The unit was probing the rims of bomb craters following an air strike in an active base camp.

(c) Recommendation: Troops should search in and around bomb craters for graves when there are indications that the enemy may have occupied the area during the air strike.

## (3) Operations of Enemy Units.

(a) Observation: Enemy forces are creatures of habit who consistently follow well-used routes despite repeated ambushes and ground operations by US forces.

(b) Evaluation: Small enemy units, suppliers and medical personnel are encountered on an almost nightly basis in certain areas, particularly near populated areas. Units have enjoyed continuing success in ambushing well-frequented trails, particularly when small elements, such as sniper teams, are employed in an ambush role.

(c) Recommendation: US troops should recognize the enemy as being a creature of habit, accustomed to operating in the same manner as he has for perhaps several years, and prone to commit errors due to a false sense of security and poor communications.

## (4) Unused Enemy Bunker Complexes.

(a) Observation: Enemy forces use unoccupied bunker complexes as a means of drawing friendly forces into killing zones.

(b) Evaluation: During a recent operation, units discovered a battalion-size bunker complex. Some of the bunkers showed recent activity while others did not. In the section which was not used, the unit found a pile of junk. They also found two large claymores covering the junk pile. It appeared that the junk was placed there deliberately to draw US personnel into the killing zone of the claymores. In the area which showed recent activity no equipment was found in the bunkers themselves. All equipment was found under tree stumps, hanging from trees and buried in the general vicinity. These areas were also heavily booby-trapped.

(c) Recommendation: Caution should be used when entering a bunker complex which shows little activity. The entire perimeter should be swept for booby traps before investigating the complex itself. In complexes which show recent activity the area around the complex should receive equal if not more attention than the complex itself.

## c. Operations.

### (1) Discovery of Cache Sites.

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(a) Observation: Enemy caches may be captured by follow-up searches of sites previously discovered.

(b) Evaluation: Enemy materials have been discovered at the same location as a previous discovery approximately one week earlier. Enemy food suppliers apparently continue to stockpile food-stuffs in accordance with pre-arranged instructions, not realizing when a cache site has been discovered.

(c) Recommendation: US troops should search known cache locations on a periodic basis in order to take advantage of the enemy's tendency to re-use cache sites.

## (2) Employment of Snipers.

(a) Observation: Employment of snipers in trees is a good observation technique as well as a means by which friendly troops can be directed to an enemy sighting.

(b) Evaluation: A sniper was positioned in the top of a tree. Although unable to engage a sighted enemy force because of his position he was able to alert a nearby platoon, which engaged the enemy force with positive results.

(c) Recommendation: That units consider employing personnel in trees to act as observers/snipers as a means of varying the operational pattern.

## (3) Combined Operations With Regional Force Units.

(a) Observation: A recent combined platoon-size ambush achieved significant results when the platoon leader, using information obtained from local farmers by Regional Force soldiers, established and executed a carefully planned ambush.

(b) Evaluation: An analysis of the contributing factors to the success of this operation revealed the following:

1 The platoon leader used the intelligence information received to his advantage. He relied upon the RF's knowledge of the area, and his own knowledge of the enemy.

2 A thorough reconnaissance of the area and of the ambush sites enabled the commander to plan his ambush position, make maximum use of the terrain, and brief the entire platoon in detail as to how the position would be established.

3 The ambush was not initiated until the main body of the enemy force was in the kill zone. Claymores, hand grenades and M-79 fire were used extensively. These fires not only inflicted severe casualties on the enemy, but made it difficult for him to determine the location of the friendly force. As a result the enemy force was rendered completely ineffective.

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4 The proper employment of all available supporting fires enabled the commander to effectively block all escape routes, forcing the enemy to suffer heavy casualties in his attempt to break contact.

(c) Recommendation: That unit commanders stress the importance of adhering to proven tactical doctrine and using the inherent intelligence value of RF units.

## (4) Tactical Security.

(a) Observation: During a recent action, a platoon-size element suffered casualties as a result of poor tactical security.

(b) Evaluation: An interview of the platoon members revealed the following inadequacies:

1 Platoon set up in the middle of a cleared area.

2 OP's were not posted.

3 There was little local security; in fact, some personnel were reading newspapers at the time of the attack.

(c) Recommendation: Leaders at all levels should stress tactical security at all times. When halts are called, emphasis should be placed on defensible positions and immediate placement of local security and OP's, preferably in trees.

## (5) Marking Friendly Positions.

(a) Observation: The use of smoke to mark friendly positions in relatively open terrain allows enemy forces to monitor the movement of friendly troops.

(b) Evaluation: Smoke is visible for long distances in open and broken terrain. It has been customary for US troops to use smoke to mark their position in order for aerial observers to accurately plot the coordinates of the friendly position.

(c) Recommendation: That units use signal mirrors and marker panels to mark their positions whenever practical.

d. Organization. None.

e. Training.

### (1) Failure to Record Zero.

(a) Observation: RF/PF soldiers fail to record the battle sight zero of their weapons.

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(b) Evaluation: The failure to record battle sight zero means that if the sight setting is banged for any reason, the battle sight setting is lost.

(c) Recommendation: An effort must be made to insure that the battle sight setting is recorded somewhere on the RF/PF soldiers' weapons.

f. Logistics. None.

g. Communications. None.

h. Materiel. None.

i. Other. None.



W. R. BOND  
Brigadier General, USA  
Commanding

2 Incl

~~1. Organizational Chart~~

~~2. Radio Relay Diagram~~

Inci 1 and 2 wd HQ, DA

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AVFBC-RE-H (1 Feb 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade  
For Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65, UIC WFEADAB

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266


THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVEGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -  
Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade for the period  
ending 31 January 1970.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
W.C. BARTEL JR  
CPT AGC  
Asst AG



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AVHGC-DST (1 Feb 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade  
For Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65, UIC WFDAB

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

30 MAR 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep)(Light) and concurs with the comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning "Marking Enemy Base Camps in Heavy Jungle Terrain", page 46, paragraph b(1): concur. Every means available should be used to mark enemy base camp areas. This method has the advantages of being easily spotted as well as being relatively long-lasting. Item has been extracted for possible inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

b. (U) Reference item concerning "Searching Areas of Air Strikes", page 46, paragraph b(2): concur. Item has been extracted for consideration for possible inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

c. (C) Reference item concerning "Operations of Enemy Units", page 47, paragraph b(3): concur. The success of ambushes on enemy frequented trails gives support to the continuing requirement for close examination of enemy habits in all aspects of their combat operation. This item has been extracted for possible inclusion in the next issue of Tips for Commanders.

d. (U) Reference item concerning "Unused Enemy Bunker Complexes", page 47, paragraph b(4): concur. Item has been extracted for consideration for inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons.

e. (C) Reference item concerning "Discovery of Cache Sites", page 47, paragraph c(1): concur. Enemy will often use an easily distinguishable land mark to aid in location of cache sites. This is also a factor in re-use of old cache sites. Item has been extracted for consideration for possible inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

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AVHGC-DST (1 Feb 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade  
For Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 UIC WPHDAB

f. (C) Reference item concerning "Employment of Snipers", page 48, paragraph c(2): concur. The employment of an observer/sniper in the trees, when terrain/vegetation permits, increases the early detection of enemy movement in the immediate area of defense positions. Using trees for observation posts (OP's) should be routinely considered when establishing local security. This item has been extracted for possible inclusion in the next issue of Tips for Commanders.

g. (U) Reference item concerning "Combined Operations with Regional Force Units", page 48, paragraph c(3): concur. Joint operations with RVNAF such as this also enhances the Improvement and Modernization of RVNAF program. Item has been extracted for consideration for possible inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
L. D. MURRAY

CPT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
HQ, II FFORCEV  
HQ, 199th Inf Bde

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GPOP-DT (Undtd) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 199th Infantry Brigade (Sep) (Light)  
for Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 UIC WYBDAB

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 3 APR 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

*D.D. Cline*

D.D. CLINE  
ELT, AGO  
Asst AG

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